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abstract
A tax on fuel combined with tax exemptions or subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles 
is implemented in many countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other 
negative externalities from road traffic. This study, however, shows that a tax on 
fuel should be combined with heavier taxation of fuel-efficient vehicles to curb 
externalities from road traffic. The tax on fuel is implemented in order to curb 
externalities linked to both consumption of fuel and road use. A heavier tax on fu-
el-efficient vehicles prevent motorists from avoiding the road user charge on fuel 
by purchasing fuel-efficient vehicles.   
Keywords: Transportation, Optimal taxation, Environmental taxation, Global 
warming 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Road transport is essential to maintain an efficient flow of goods, services and people, but 
generates costly negative externalities in the form of CO2 emissions, local air pollution, accidents, 
congestion and noise. Many countries have implemented taxes on fuel combined with tax exemp-
tions or subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles to curb externalities linked to both fuel and mileage. 
However, the gain in terms of reduced externalities per liter of fuel is diminished by the fact that 
households avoid the mileage-related tax component by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles, 
according to the highly influential study by Parry and Small (2005). Their optimal US and UK tax 
rates on gasoline are reduced accordingly. A range of other studies have adopted their method to 
calculate optimal tax rates on fuel in other countries; see e.g. Anton-Sarabia and Hernandez-Trillo 
(2014), Lin and Zeng (2014).   
An alternative strategy consists of imposing a tax on fuel-efficient vehicles which cancels 
out the gains of this avoidance. This strategy has implications for the optimal fuel tax, as avoidance 
resulted in a lowering of the optimal tax rate on fuel in Parry and Small (2005). Their optimal tax 
rate on gasoline also includes a revenue-raising Ramsey tax component. However, according to 
Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) the Ramsey tax component is excluded from a welfare-maximizing 
tax system. Hence, more research is required to reveal how taxes on fuel and vehicles should be 
designed to curb externalities from road traffic.     
The present study explores whether this alternative strategy is desirable. The study devel-
ops a new model framework which calculates optimal tax formulas for combinations of taxes on fuel 
and vehicles. The theoretical foundation for these tax formulas is based on pioneering contributions 
by Innes (1996) and Fullerton and West (2002). However, the results of these studies are difficult 
to transform into optimal real-world taxes on fuel and vehicles. Significant progress is made in the 
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present study, which develops these theories into operational tax formulas that are comparable with 
current taxation of fuel and vehicles. Scenarios with myopic behavior and electric vehicles (EVs) 
are included. The study shows that the tax rate on fuel in both the US and the UK is less than op-
timal, and that the tax on fuel-efficient vehicles should exceed the tax on fuel-intensive vehicles. 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections; Section 2 provides a literature review, 
Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 compares optimal taxes on fuel and vehicles with current 
taxes on fuel and vehicles. Section 5 provides a conclusion.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
Parry and Small (2005) show that the optimal uniform tax rate on gasoline in the United 
States is more than twice the current rate, while that for the United Kingdom is about half the 
current rate. Their optimal tax rate on gasoline consists of an adjusted Pigouvian tax component 
which includes damage from carbon emissions and other driving-related externalities, a Ramsey 
tax component designed to raise tax revenue, and a congestion feedback component which cap-
tures welfare gains as labor supply increased as congestion decreases. Driving-related external-
ities due to congestion and accidents as well as the Ramsey tax component are dominant, while 
global warming and congestion feedback are modes. Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) esti-
mate higher accident-related externalities, which suggests that the UK gasoline tax is closer to 
the optimal level than the US tax. Several objections can be made to the methodology in Parry 
and Small (2005), however. First, differentiated taxes on purchase of vehicles are as mentioned 
not considered, even though Innes (1996), Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) and De Borger (2001) 
show that restrictions on taxes on the use of vehicles imply that taxes on the purchase of vehicles 
are desirable. Indeed, subsidizing substitutes for polluting goods might be desirable when gov-
ernments are unable to tax emissions directly, according to Sandmo (1976). Second, their opti-
mal tax rate on gasoline includes a Ramsey tax component. However, according to Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976), a general set of assumptions excludes the Ramsey tax component from a wel-
fare-maximizing tax system. Indeed, Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) show that a Pigouvian tax on 
polluting goods is part of a welfare-maximizing tax system within a Mirrlees-economy framework. 
 Third, the tax theory adopted by Parry and Small (2005) is unable to generate a unique optimal 
tax rate on polluting goods according to Fullerton (1997). The explanation is that the allocation of 
resources is unchanged when a uniform tax increase on consumer goods is combined with a propor-
tional, revenue-neutral reduction in taxation of income. Hence, welfare is unchanged even though 
the tax rate on polluting goods is increased.
Innes (1996) and Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) study the optimal design of taxes on both 
fuel and vehicles. Innes (1996) shows that optimal vehicle taxes, or their regulatory equivalents, 
approximately equal the social cost of a vehicle’s predicted emissions less the portion of costs that 
is internalized by a uniform gasoline tax. Fullerton and West (2002) extend his analysis and ex-
plore tax combinations that implement the social planner choices of mileage, engine size, pollution 
control equipment, and fuel type. They find that vehicles with bigger engines should be subsidized 
(taxed) if the tax rate on fuel, which equals the marginal damage per gallon of fuel, more (less) than 
completely internalizes the impact of engine size. According to their study, empirical investigations 
are required to determine whether to tax or subsidize vehicles with large engines. Fullerton and West 
(2010) extend the analysis in Fullerton and West (2002) with vehicle age and simulate different 
scenarios. They find that the three-part instrument involving a gas tax, an engine-size subsidy, and a 
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new-car subsidy maximize welfare. The engine-size subsidy does not increase welfare significantly, 
however.        
These insightful studies leave several questions unanswered. First, Fullerton and West 
(2002) do not investigate how the optimal tax rate on fuel should be designed when households 
avoid the mileage-related component of fuel tax by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. In con-
trast, the optimal tax rate on fuel in Parry and Small (2005) is reduced due to such avoidance. Sec-
ond, the optimal engine-size subsidy is desirable if the tax on fuel is unable to completely internalize 
the impact of engine size. However, they are unable to determine the size or the sign of the subsidy. 
Hence, these results are hard to transform into optimal real-world taxes on fuel and vehicles. Third, 
several empirical studies find that households have rational expectations when purchasing vehicles; 
see Sallee et al. (2016) and Busse et al. (2013). Some studies find support for myopic behavior, how-
ever; see Grigolon et al. (2014) and Allcott and Wozny (2014). Myopic behavior is not considered 
by Innes (1996) or Fullerton and West (2002, 2010).    
These weaknesses in Parry and Small (2005) concerning their omission of taxation of ve-
hicles, their Ramsey tax component, and the lack of a unique tax rate, and issues in Fullerton and 
West (2002, 2010) concerning the lack of operational tax estimates, the impact of tax avoidance, and 
failure to consider myopic behavior are resolved in this study. The study contributes by developing 
a new model framework which calculates optimal combinations of taxes on fuel and vehicles which 
are comparable to real-world taxes. Tax estimates for scenarios with myopic behavior are included. 
Avoidance of mileage-related taxes on fuel through the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles, and tax-
ation of fuel-efficient vehicles to combat such avoidance, is incorporated into the model framework. 
The Ramsey tax component is excluded, as optimal taxes on fuel and vehicles are obtained by 
balancing the efficiency cost of tax distortions against the welfare gain of reduced externalities. The 
Pigouvian solution in Jacobs and de Mooij (2015) is not attainable, however, when policy instru-
ments are restricted to a uniform tax on fuel and differentiated taxes on vehicles. The optimal tax 
difference between fuel and non-polluting goods includes optimal combinations of tax rates on fuel 
and non-polluting goods, and hence resolves the objection concerning the lack of a unique optimal 
tax rate. The optimal tax difference between fuel and non-polluting goods is compared with current 
tax differences in the US and the UK. The study also compares optimal and current taxes on vehicles 
in these countries.      
3. THE MODEL FRAMEWORK   
3.1 Households    
Households choose driving distances and types of vehicle with varying fuel-efficiencies. 
Household i’s utility,  iu , net of externalities is given by the quasilinear utility function 
( )= + +i i i iu u km b c ,                                                                                                                   (1) 
when a fuel-intensive vehicle is chosen. ib  equals zero if a fuel-efficient vehicle is chosen. The util-
ity,  iu , is determined by driving distance measured in kilometers, ikm , consumption of a non-pollut-
ing consumer good, ic , and the utility associated with owning a fuel-intensive vehicle instead of a 
fuel-efficient vehicle,  ib . The marginal utility of additional driving distance is positive, 0′ >u , but de-
clines as the driving distance increases, 0′′ <u . This feature of the utility function illustrates the fact 
that some trips are more important/ necessary to households than other trips. The vehicle specific 
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utility parameter, bi, differs across households as transportation needs and requirements differ across 
households. Some households may prefer the fuel-efficient vehicle, i.e. their utility parameter, ib , is 
negative. Household i’s budget constraint is given by the equation 
( ) , ,= + − + − −i l l j i car j car jc y k p t f km t p ,                                                                           (2) 
where , =j high low indicates fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicle, respectively. Consumption 
of the non-polluting good,  ic , equals a fixed income,  y, plus government transfers, k minus costs of 
fuel, ( )+l l j ip t f km , minus the tax on the chosen vehicle, , car jt , minus the price of the chosen vehicle, 
, car jp . Utility maximization with respect to ikm  implies that   
( )′ = +
ikm l l j
u p t f , or                                                                                                                 (3)
( )=i j lkm d t ,                                                                                                                               (4)           
where , =j high low indicates the two types of vehicle. Equation (3) shows that the marginal gain in 
utility of one additional kilometer, ′
ikm
u , equals the private cost of driving one additional kilometer, 
( )+l l jp t f . This cost is given by the price per liter of fuel, lp , the tax per liter of fuel, lt , and the fuel 
economy measured in liters per kilometer, jf . Hence, driving is restricted to trips where the benefit 
exceeds the costs. Vehicle maintenance and capital depreciation are excluded from the operating 
costs of vehicles to simplify the model framework. However, a tax designed to correct for negative 
externalities is not influenced by these operating costs when externalities are not influenced by them. 
The model framework is unable to distinguish between a tax on fuel-efficient vehicles 
and a subsidy on fuel-intensive vehicles. The tax on purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles, ,  car hight , 
is therefore labeled cart , and the tax on purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles is set equal to zero. The 
indirect utility function net of externalities for each household, i, for each type of vehicle, is found 
by inserting equation (2) into equation (1), and then implementing equation (4).   
( )( ) ( ) ( ), , = + + + − + − −i high high l i l l high high l car car highv u d t b y k p t f d t t p , and        (5)  
( )( ) ( ) ( ), , = + + − + −i low low l l l low low l car lowv u d t y k p t f d t p ,
Assume that households are ranked from high to low according to their utility parameter, ib , and that 
the first N  households have chosen the fuel-intensive vehicle. Assume that their accumulated utility 
as a result of owning a fuel-intensive vehicle instead of a fuel-efficient vehicle, BA, is given by the 
expression 
20,5= −maxBA b N aN ,                                                                                                              (6)
Where 0>a  and no restrictions are imposed on maxb . Households choose the type of vehicle that 
maximizes utility. Households therefore choose the fuel-intensive vehicle up to the point where 
household number N  is indifferent between types of vehicles. This equilibrium condition is given 
by the expression 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) , + − + + − + − −high l max l l high high l car car highu d t b aN y k p t f d t t p                   (7)
( )( ) ( ) ( ) , = + + − + −low l l l low low l car lowu d t y k p t f d t p .                                                                                                          
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Households that derive higher utility from owning a fuel-intensive vehicle will choose a fuel-inten-
sive vehicle. Households that derive lower utility from owning a fuel-intensive vehicle will choose 
a fuel-efficient vehicle. Equation (7) determines the number of households which choose the fu-
el-intensive vehicle, as a function of fuel taxes, vehicle taxes, exogenous parameters and prices. 
Equation (7) is written as equation (8) to simplify notations.    
( ),= l carN N t t                                                                                                                            (8)
The total number of households is N . Hence, the number of households that choose the fuel-effi-
cient vehicle amounts to  
= −lowN N N .                                                                                                                            (9)
3.2 Social costs 
The social cost of driving consists of damage from CO2 emissions and damage from mile-
age-related externalities. The damage from CO2 emissions, 2COS , is given by the expression   
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 = + −CO CO high high l CO low low lS p Nf d t p N N f d t .                                                      (10)
The damage from CO2 emissions, 2 COS , equals the damage caused by CO2 emissions per liter of 
fuel, 2COp , multiplied by the number of liters of fuel consumed by households with fuel-intensive ve-
hicles, ( )high high lNf d t , plus the damage due to CO2 emissions per liter of fuel, 2COp , multiplied by the 
number of liters of fuel consumed by households with fuel-efficient vehicles, ( ) ( )− low low lN N f d t . 
A share of the current lifetime emissions from vehicles originates from production of vehicles and 
energy; see Hawkins et al. (2012). CO2 emissions from production of energy and vehicles are ex-
cluded from the model framework, however. This assumption is relevant when all polluters pay for 
their own emissions. The assumption is also relevant when these emissions are included in an emis-
sion trading system like that of the EU, and thus are neutralized by adjustments in other emission 
sources. The cost of mileage-related damage, dS , is given by the expression
( ) ( ) ( ) = + −d d high l d low lS p Nd t p N N d t .                                                                               (11)
dS  equals the damage per kilometer, dp , multiplied by the number of kilometers driven by house-
holds with fuel-intensive vehicles, ( )high lNd t , plus the damage per kilometer, dp , multiplied by the 
number of kilometers driven by households with fuel-efficient vehicles, ( ) ( ) − low lN N d t . The costs 
of traffic congestion and damage due to accidents dominates, while the costs of local pollution are 
more modest. These costs are influenced by a range of factors like drinking and driving, reckless 
driving and speeding. It is assumed that the present level of drinking and driving, reckless driving 
and speeding is preserved by current traffic laws and regulations.   
3.3 Taxation of fuel and vehicles      
Tax revenue collected is transferred to households. Each household receives a lump-sum 
transfer, k. The transfer is chosen to conform to the constraint of a balanced government budget. The 
government budget constraint is given by the following equation 
( ) ( ) ( ) = + + −l high high l car l low low lNk Nt f d t Nt N N t f d t .                                                 (12)
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Total transfers,  Nk , equal tax revenue from taxation of fuel for fuel-intensive vehicles,
( ) l high high lNt f d t , plus tax revenue from taxation of fuel-intensive vehicles, carNt , plus tax revenue 
from taxation of fuel for fuel-efficient vehicles, ( ) ( )− l low low lN N t f d t . 
The welfare function is given by the indirect utility function minus the social costs of 
road traffic. The sum of indirect utility functions net of externalities, equation (5), is found by ac-
cumulating over the number of individuals choosing fuel-efficient and fuel-intensive vehicles. The 
accumulated utility associated with owning a fuel-intensive vehicle is given by equation (6). The 
social costs of road traffic are given by equations (10) and (11). The government budget constraint, 
equation (12), and the condition determining the allocation of vehicles, equation (8), are incorpo-
rated in the welfare function. The government chooses the uniform tax rate on fuel, lt , and the tax on 
purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles, cart , to maximize welfare. The problem is
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2
,
1
Max , , ,
2
+ + −
l car
l car high l max l car l cart t
Ny N t t u d t b N t t aN t t                               (13)
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), , ,  + − − + l car low l l car car high l high high lN N t t u d t N t t p p f d t
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 2, , − − + − l car car low l low low l CO l car high high lN N t t p p f d t p N t t f d t
( )( ) ( )2 ,− −CO l car low low lp N N t t f d t ( ) ( ),− d l car high lp N t t d t
( ) ( )( , )− −d l car low lp N N t t d t .
The tax on fuel affects the number of fuel-intensive vehicles, ( ),l carN t t  , the driving distance of 
fuel-intensive vehicles, ( )high ld t , and the driving distance of fuel-efficient vehicles, ( )low ld t . The tax 
on purchase of fuel-intensive vehicles affects the number of fuel-intensive vehicles, ( ),l carN t t . Note 
that choice of transfers, k , is excluded from the optimization problem as the government budget 
constraint is incorporated in the welfare function. The first order conditions imply that
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 2+ − − − − −high l max car high l high high l CO high high l d high lu d t b aN p p f d t p f d t p d t    (14)
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 2= − − − −low l car low l low low l CO low low l d low lu d t p p f d t p f d t p d t .                                                                                                          
See appendix A. Second order conditions are presented in Appendix B. Equation (14) 
shows that benefits minus the private and social costs of one additional fuel-intensive vehi-
cle equal the benefits minus private and social costs of one additional fuel-efficient vehicle 
. The optimal additional tax rate on fuel equals 
( )( )
( )
*
2
+′ ′
′
−
= +
+ ′−
l l
l l
high t low t d
l CO
high t high low t low
Nd N N d p
t p
Nd f N N d f
.                                                                               (15)
The optimal additional tax rate on fuel, * lt , equals CO2-related damage per liter of fuel, 2 COp , plus 
the road user charge on fuel, labeled dt , given by the second term on the right-hand side of equation 
(15). This road user charge equals the reduction in mileage-related damage due to a marginal tax 
increase on fuel (the numerator), divided by the reduction in fuel consumption due to a marginal tax 
increase on fuel (the denominator). Thus the road user charge on fuel equals the reduction in mile-
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age-related damage per liter of reduced fuel consumption due to a marginal tax increase on fuel. The 
road user charge on fuel exceeds mileage-related externalities,  dp , for fuel-intensive vehicles. The 
road user charge on fuel is lower than mileage-related externalities,  dp , for fuel-efficient vehicles 
. The welfare-maximizing driving distance for fuel-intensive (fuel-efficient) vehicles is lower 
(higher) than the social planner solution ( )  social socialhigh lowkm km  as policy tools are restricted. This outcome 
shows that the approach in Fullerton and West (2002), where the tax system is designed to imple-
ment the social planner solution, is inconsistent with the optimal tax solutions in the present study. 
A graphical illustration of the optimal additional tax rate based on equation (3) and (15), the social 
costs of driving, ( )2 + +l CO j dp p f p , and driving distance are presented in Figure 1.  
The welfare-maximizing tax on fuel-intensive vehicles equals
t
N N
N
f f
N
N
d
d
f N N
N
f
p dcar
low high
high t
low t
high low
d hi
l
l
* 
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
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gh
high t
low t
low high
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low t
hi
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d
d
f f
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d
d
f
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*  


 

 gh low
d low l
N N
N
f
p d t


 * .  (16)
Both terms on the right side are negative. Hence, there should be heavier taxes on fuel-efficient ve-
hicles than on fuel-intensive vehicles. Inserting the expression for the road user charge on fuel, dt , 
from equation (15) into equation (16) implies that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* = − − −car d d high high l d d low low lt p t f d t p t f d t .                                                   (17)           
Equation (17) shows that the optimal tax on fuel-intensive vehicles, * cart , equals mileage-related dam-
age minus road user charges for fuel-intensive vehicles, ( ) ( ) −d d high high lp t f d t , minus the difference 
between mileage-related damage and road user charges for fuel-efficient vehicles,( ) ( ) −d d low low lp t f d t
. Future taxes on fuel are fully accounted for by households with rational expectations. Therefore, 
the CO2 tax on fuel provides a correct incentive for the choice of vehicle in this case. The choice of 
vehicle is distorted, however, as the mileage-related tax on fuel deviates from the mileage-related 
externality. The heavier tax on fuel-efficient vehicles neutralizes this distortion. Hence, household’s 
Figure 1. The optimal additional tax rate on fuel  
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choice of vehicles implements the socially desirable allocation of vehicles given by equation (14). 
Solid lines in Figure 2 represent indirect utility, , i jv , as a function of the allocation of vehicles when 
the optimal tax on fuel and vehicles is implemented. The dotted line represents the indirect utility, 
,
=cart zero
i highv , when the vehicle tax equals zero.  
Some limitations should be considered when results are interpreted. The simple one-period 
model framework adopted, where households with specific preferences with respect to driving and 
type of vehicle choose driving distance and type of vehicle, suggests that results are limited to spe-
cific settings. The model framework excludes other choices, such as economical driving, and other 
externalities, like the rat race for status. Other policy tools designed to reduce traffic-related exter-
nalities, like parking fees, toll roads and CAFE standards, are omitted from the model framework. 
Heterogeneity along dimensions like demand for driving, income and environmental awareness are 
also excluded. The simple model framework is, however, able to arrive at optimal tax formulas that 
are mainly determined by the damage fuel and vehicles inflict upon society. Such damage is deter-
mined by empirical estimates, so tax formulas are mainly determined by these estimates.   
3.4 A fixed stock of vehicles   
This section assumes a fixed stock of vehicles, thereby precluding avoidance of road user 
charge on fuel through the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles. The tax on purchase of vehicles does 
not influence driving distance in the current model framework. Thus the government maximization 
problem is reduced to choosing the tax rate on fuel. The problem is 
( )( ) 21Max 
2
+ + −
l
high l maxt
Ny Nu d t b N aN                                                                        (18)
( ) ( )( ) ( ),  + − − + low l car high l high high lN N u d t N p p f d t
( ) ( ) ( ), 2 − − + − car low l low low l CO high high lN N p p f d t p Nf d t
( ) ( )2− −CO low low lp N N f d t ( )− d high lp Nd t
( )( )− −d low lp N N d t .
Figure 2. The optimal allocation of vehicles 
Efficient Combination of Taxes on Fuel and Vehicles / 395
Copyright © 2019 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
The first order condition is identical with the first order condition that determines tl in appendix A. 
The second order condition is presented in appendix C.   
( )( )
( )
**
2
+ −
= +
+
′
′ ′−
′
l l
l l
high t low t d
l CO
high t high low t low
Nd N N d p
t p
Nd f N N d f
.                                                                             (19)
The optimal tax formula for fuel, equation (19), is identical with the expression for the optimal tax 
formula for fuel in the case where households choose vehicles, equation (15). This shows that it is 
sub-optimal to lower the tax on fuel when households avoid the road user charge on fuel by purchas-
ing fuel-efficient vehicles.         
3.5 Myopic behavior  
Empirical estimates by Allcott and Wozny (2014) show that vehicle prices move as though 
consumers are indifferent between 1 dollar in discounted future gas costs and 0.76 dollar in vehicle 
purchase price. Such myopic behavior is incorporated into the model framework in the present 
study by assuming that households value future discounted costs and gains of driving at 70 percent 
of actual value when choosing a vehicle. This feature is implemented by modifying the equilibrium 
condition, equation (7), where a household is indifferent between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient 
vehicles. The new equilibrium condition is given by
( )( ) ( ) ( ) , 0,7 0,7+ − + + − + − −high l max l l high high l car car highu d t b aN y k p t f d t t p         (20)
( )( ) ( ) ( ) , 0,7 0,7= + + − + −low l l l low low l car lowu d t y k p t f d t p .                                                                                                          
The allocation of vehicles is affected by myopic behavior, as future benefits of fuel-efficient vehicles 
are not fully taken into consideration when vehicles are purchased. The choice of driving distance 
is not affected because the utility and operating costs of driving take place in the same periods. The 
perfect-foresight government maximizes an individualistic welfare function in which actual future 
gains and costs are incorporated. The maximization problem of the government is found by replac-
ing equation (7) with equation (20) in problem (13). First order conditions which determine the tax 
on fuel are identical with conditions in problem (13). 
( )( )
( )
***
2
+ −
= +
+
′ ′
′−′
l l
l l
high t low t d
l CO
high t high low t low
Nd N N d p
t p
Nd f N N d f
                                                                               (21)
The optimal tax formula for fuel should therefore not be modified on account of myopic behavior. 
First order conditions also imply that equation (14) is satisfied. However, the optimal purchase tax 
on fuel-intensive vehicles is modified according to equation (20); see appendix D.    
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
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )*** *** *** *** *** ***0,3 + − + − − +  low l l l low low l high l l l high high lu d t p t f d t u d t p t f d t
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The first two terms on the right-hand side are both negative, and identical with the terms in equation 
(16). The last term is positive. The explanation is that households underestimate the rewards of a 
 fuel-efficient vehicle. An additional purchase tax on vehicles with higher fuel consumption contrib-
utes to correcting for mistakes due to myopic behavior. 
3.6 Electric vehicles  
A user charge on electric vehicles is desirable to correct for mileage-related externalities. 
However, this section analyzes optimal taxation of fuel and purchases of electric vehicles when the 
use of electric vehicles is not taxed. The problem is analyzed within the present model framework 
by replacing low-emission vehicles with electric vehicles, and by assuming that the private cost of 
using an electric vehicle is zero. Thus, the driving distance for electric vehicles is determined by 
the condition, 0′ =
lowkm
u . CO2 emissions from production of electricity and electric vehicles are ex-
cluded. The maximization problem of the government is found by inserting 0=lowf , and by assum-
ing that ( )low ld t  is fixed in the perfect foresight problem in (13).  First order conditions imply that  
2 ′ = + +highkm l high CO high du p f p f p .                                                                                             (23)
Inserting equation (23) into equation (3) gives  
****
2= +
d
l CO
high
p
t p
f
.                                                                                                                         (24)
Thus, the optimal tax difference between fuel and non-polluting consumer goods equals the mar-
ginal damage of CO2 emissions plus the mileage-related marginal damage of road transport. The 
first order condition with respect to cart  combined with equations (24) and (7) implies that 
**** = −car d lowt p km .                                                                                                                             (25) 
Equation (25) shows that the optimal additional tax on purchase of electric vehicles equals mile-
age-related damage associated with electric vehicles. The cost of CO2 emissions and mileage-re-
lated damage due to fossil fuel vehicles is incorporated into the price of fuel. The cost of mileage-re-
lated damage due to electric vehicles is incorporated into the price of the vehicle. Thus, rational 
households face costs attributable to externalities when choosing between a fossil fuel vehicle and 
an electric vehicle. Note that greater damage from CO2 emissions, preferences for vehicles due to 
factors such as range anxiety, and price differences between vehicles do not alter the optimal addi-
tional tax on EVs expressed by equation (25).1  
3.7 Other tax instruments
The impact of introducing other policy instruments is analyzed by calculating the social 
planner solution and then determining which policy packages implement the social planner solution. 
The social planner solution is found by maximizing the objective function in problem (13) with 
respect to the allocation of vehicles, N, and driving distance for each vehicle, kmhigh and kmlow. The 
first order conditions w.r.t N imply that      
1. Differences in mileage-related costs across geographic regions call for geographic tax differentiation across regions. 
Implementation of geographic tax differentiation favors an annual vehicle tax, as differentiated taxes on purchases are more 
likely to be subject to evasion.
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( ) , 2+ − − − − −high max car high l high high CO high high d highu km b aN p p f km p f km p km                    (26)
( ) , 2= − − − −low car low l low low CO low low d lowu km p p f km p f km p km .                                                                                                          
Equation (26) shows that the benefits minus private and social costs of one additional fuel-intensive 
vehicle equal the benefits minus private and social costs of one additional fuel-efficient vehicle. The 
first order conditions also imply that 
2 ′ = + +highkm l high CO high du p f p f p , and                                                                                    (27)
2 ′ = + +lowkm l low CO low du p f p f p .                                                                                               (28)
The left-hand sides of equations (27) and (28) equal the utility of one additional kilometer for each 
type of vehicle. This equals the price of fuel multiplied by fuel consumption per kilometer, plus 
the cost of carbon multiplied by fuel consumption per kilometer, plus the mileage-related damage 
caused by driving one kilometer.  
The government is able to implement the social planner solution when the tax on fuel can 
be differentiated between vehicles with different fuel economies. Assuming rational expectations 
implies that the social planner solution is implemented by choosing a zero tax on fuel-intensive 
vehicles combined with tax rates on fuel which equals
, 2= +
d
l j CO
j
p
t p
f
,                                                                                                                          (29)
where ,=j high low. The proof consists of incorporating these tax rates into equations (3) and (7) 
and comparing with the social planner solution expressed by equations (26), (27) and (28). Note 
that the tax on fuel is higher for fuel-efficient vehicles in this case, so the result in Montage (2015) 
is confirmed. A tax on fuel which equals the marginal damage of CO2 emissions, a tax on driv-
ing distance which equals the marginal damage of mileage-related externalities, and a zero tax on 
 fuel-intensive vehicles, also implements the social planner solution.2 Both these solutions lead to 
a more efficient allocation of vehicles and driving distance than the solution with a uniform tax on 
fuel combined with taxation of fuel-intensive vehicles; see also Ashley et al. (2017) and Montag 
(2015). However, a GPS-based system is more costly to administer and is likely to impose infor-
mation-processing costs and undesirable surveillance; see Parry et al. (2007). A tax on fuel which 
differentiates between various characteristics of vehicles does not differentiate between geographic 
locations or peak and off-peak periods, and may lead to costly monitoring to prevent high-tax fuel 
vehicles using low-tax fuel. 
One may argue that a road user charge based on odometer readings or pay-as-you-drive 
insurance combined with congestion charges and toll roads resembles GPS-based road user charges. 
However, such charges are costly to administer, susceptible to evasion, and lead to undesirable traf-
fic planning designed to avoid toll stations; see Parry (2002). Parking fees, reduced speed-limits and 
road-investment strategies are also designed to curb traffic-related externalities. The optimal design 
of such policy tool combinations is beyond the scope of this study, however.    
2. Myopic behavior calls for tax differentiation according to Jansen and Denis (1999).
398 / The Energy Journal
All rights reserved. Copyright © 2019 by the IAEE.
4. OPTIMAL VERSUS CURRENT TAXATION OF FUEL AND VEHICLES   
A few countries have introduced GPS-based road user charges on heavy duty vehicles, but 
systems for light duty passenger vehicles are lagging behind.  However, many countries tax both 
fuel and vehicles to curb externalities from road traffic. This section illustrates results by comparing 
optimal combinations of taxes on fuel and vehicles with current taxes in the US and the UK.3
4.1 Fuel  
The tax rate on fuel differs substantially across countries. The average US tax on gasoline 
amounted to 45.7 cents per gallon in 2017 according to the US Energy Information Administration. 
The average combined sales tax (8.4 percent according to Thomson Reuters, 2015) of spending the 
cost of one gallon of gasoline on non-polluting goods amounts to approximately 17.8 cents. Thus 
the current tax difference between fuel and non-polluting goods amounts to approximately 28 cents 
per gallon of gasoline in the US. The average toll per gallon of gasoline amounts to approximately 
9 cents according to Bjertnæs (2017). The current US tax difference between fuel and non-polluting 
goods, including fees for toll roads, equals 0.37 dollar per gallon of gasoline. The tax difference 
between gasoline and non-polluting consumer goods in the UK amounts to the fuel tax of £0.5795 
per liter of gasoline, or $2.69 per gallon; see UK (2017). The additional value-added tax is levied on 
most goods including fuel, and thus does not influence the tax difference. Toll per gallon of gasoline 
on roads and bridges in the UK is marginal according to Bjertnæs (2017).   
The formula for the optimal tax difference between fuel and non-polluting goods is given 
by equations (15), (19) and (21). Several simplifying assumptions are adopted in order to calculate 
the optimal tax difference. First, the utility function is formulated so that the reduction in mileage 
due to a tax increase on fuel is identical for households with a fuel-intensive and a fuel-efficient 
vehicle in the optimal solution, i.e. =′ ′
l lhigh t low t
d d . Second, parameters are chosen so that the stock of 
fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles is identical. Equation (15) is transformed into
*
2 0,5 0,5
= +
+
d
l CO
high low
p
t p
f f
.                                                                                                         (30) 
The optimal tax difference between fuel and non-polluting goods equals the marginal damage of 
CO2 emissions plus the average mileage-related marginal damage in this case. The marginal dam-
age of CO2 emissions, or social cost of carbon, has been estimated by more than 100 peer-reviewed 
studies according to the report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007). 
The average cost estimate is $43 per ton of CO2. A cost estimate of $50 is common, as some recent 
estimates are higher. Consumption of one liter of gasoline generates 2.32 kg CO2, which amounts 
to approximately $0.44 per gallon of gasoline; see Table 1. This estimate is relevant for countries 
facing a quota price, and for countries concerned with the global damage of carbon emissions. 
The average mileage-related marginal damage related to road transport for the US and the 
UK amounts to $1.92 and $2.92 per gallon of gasoline, respectively, according to Parry and Small 
(2005). Hence, optimal taxes in the US and the UK amount to $2.36 and $3.36 per gallon, respec-
tively, of gasoline. Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) show that accident-related externalities are 
related to the weight of vehicles. Internalizing such externalities by a weight-varying mileage tax or 
3. The US and the UK are used as examples to enable a comparison with the results of Parry and Small (2005). The case 
of Germany and Norway is included in an earlier version of this study, see Bjertnæs (2017).
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a $0.97-$2.17 per gallon of gasoline tax is similar for most vehicles. Their estimates suggest that the 
UK gas tax is closer to the optimal level than the US tax. 
4.2 Vehicles                   
Several European countries redesigned their vehicle tax system in the mid-2000s and im-
plemented bonus-malus schemes that favored fuel-efficient vehicles. Some countries imposed a 
CO2-based tax on purchase of vehicles, while other countries imposed annual CO2-based regis-
tration taxes; see Klier and Linn (2015). According to their study, CO2-based tax on purchase of 
vehicles leads to larger reductions in the average emission rates of new vehicles. The emission 
reduction of such taxation is eroded as sales of new vehicles expand, however (Alberini and Bareit, 
2017), and as the retirement of high-emitting vehicles is postponed (Alberini et al., 2018). The an-
nual CO2-based registration tax, levied on both new and existing vehicles, is not burdened by these 
undesirable impacts according to Alberini et al. (2018). The impact of these annual taxes on the 
average emission rates of new vehicles is modest, however, (Klier and Linn, 2015), and the cost per 
ton of reduced CO2 emissions is substantial (Alberini and Bareit, 2017).   
The current annual UK vehicle excise duty increases with theoretical CO2 emissions per 
kilometer; see Brand et al. (2013). The tax is higher the first year after registration, and thus rep-
resents a mix between an annual tax and a tax on purchase of vehicles. The current US tax on vehicle 
purchases differs across states and counties. These taxes and fees generate a marginal tax difference 
between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles. However, Goldberg (1998) argues that the US 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard acts as a modest firm-specific tax on fuel-inten-
sive vehicles relative to fuel-efficient vehicles. 
The optimal tax difference between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles in the case 
with rational expectations is given by equation (16). This equation is employed to illustrate optimal 
US tax differences between the following Volkswagen Passat 2017 models: the 1.6 TDI, the 2.0 TDI 
DSG 4MOTION and the GTE plug-in hybrid. Tests show that their fuel consumption per kilometer 
equals 0.041, 0.051, and 0.041 liters, respectively. Parameter values presented in appendix E imply 
that the optimal tax on the 1.6 model is $1242 more than on the 2.0 model. The optimal additional 
tax on the GTE also amounts to $1242.     
The optimal tax difference between fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles in the case 
with myopic behavior is given by equation (22). The optimal tax difference equals the optimal tax 
difference with rational expectations, equation (16), plus 30 percent of the difference between the 
utility minus the costs of driving a fuel-intensive vehicle, and the utility minus the costs of driving a 
fuel-efficient vehicle. The optimal tax on the 1.6 model is $417 more than the 2.0 model in this case; 
see appendix E. The optimal additional tax on the GTE also equals $417. A sensitivity test shows 
that the optimal additional tax, equation (22), equals zero when households value future discounted 
gains and costs at approximately 55 percent of actual values. However, empirical studies reveal 
more modest myopic behavior.   
Table 1: Tax rates and costs: USD per gallon of gasoline, 2016.   
The cost 
of CO2 
emissions
Average 
mileage- 
related costs
Optimal tax 
difference, 
fuel vs. goods   
Current tax 
difference, 
fuel vs. goods   
Current fees, 
toll road  
Current road 
user charge, 
tax plus fees  
USA 0.44 1.92 2.36 0.28 0.09 0.37
UK 0.44 2.92 3.36 2.69 0 2.69
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4.3 Electric vehicles                   
The US federal tax credit per new electric vehicle ranges from $2 500 to $7 500 accord-
ing to the US department of energy. Many states offer additional benefits, including subsidies for 
charging stations. California, for example, offers an additional $7 000 cash rebate for low income 
households that purchase an electric vehicle. However, some US states have imposed annual road 
user charges of $50–300 as EV users avoid the user charge levied on fuel. EV owners do not pay 
vehicle taxes in the UK. A £4 000 subsidy on the purchase of electric cars with a range greater than 
a specified limit has also been introduced, according to the UK government web site.    
The optimal additional tax on electric vehicles is given by equation (25) when the use 
of electric vehicles is untaxed and households are rational. A lifetime driving distance of 240 000 
kilometer and mileage-related damage of $0.03 per kilometer implies an optimal additional tax 
on electric vehicles of $7 200. The optimal tax difference between fossil fuel vehicles and electric 
vehicles in the case with myopic behavior equals the optimal tax difference with rational expecta-
tions plus a correction for myopic behavior. The correction equals approximately thirty percent of a 
vehicle’s lifetime fuel costs within the current model framework. The lifetime cost of fuel equals the 
optimal consumer price of fuel, $1.123 per liter, multiplied by liters consumed per kilometer, 0.06, 
multiplied by lifetime driving distance, 240 000 km. Thus, these assumptions generate an optimal 
additional tax on electric vehicles of approximately USD 2 400 in this case.   
4.4 Policy implications  
The comparison of optimal and current taxation of fuel and vehicles in the present study re-
veals substantial differences. Both the optimal US tax difference between gasoline and non-polluting 
goods of $2.36 per gallon, and the optimal UK tax difference of $3.36 per gallon, are substantially 
higher than current tax differences. The corresponding optimal tax estimates in Parry and Small 
(2005) are only $1.01 and $1.34 per gallon of gasoline. The study also shows that the optimal tax 
on fuel should be combined with tax rebates for fuel-intensive vehicles. In contrast, many European 
countries have done quite the opposite, and implemented bonus-malus schemes with tax rebates 
for fuel-efficient vehicles. The US CAFE standard offers similar rebates for fuel-efficient vehicles.  
The suggested tax increase on fuel may, however, face political resistance in countries like 
the US, where there is a low tax on fuel combined with high fuel consumption per capita; see Ham-
mar et al. (2004). Opposing voters and lobby groups, on the other hand, are likely to benefit from 
the suggested optimal and lenient taxation of fuel-intensive vehicles. The optimal policy package, 
combining a tax increase on fuel with tax rebates on fuel-intensive vehicles, should therefore face 
less political resistance. The political restraints described in Hammar et al. (2004) indicate that sub-
stantial political resistance should be expected, however.      
Many countries, including the US and the UK, have introduced tax exemptions and subsi-
dies for electric vehicles to promote the development of clean transport technology, and possibly to 
prepare their car industry for an electric future. The present study shows that the optimal additional 
tax on electric vehicles equals the value of their mileage-related externalities when the use of EVs is 
untaxed and other market imperfections are absent. This optimal additional tax is reduced if sales of 
new EVs boost technological development. These mileage-related externalities are spread across the 
globe, and may therefore be substantial. It is challenging to quantify the externality per EV sold, but 
additional adverse impacts, such as increased car use and less public transport, should be expected; 
see Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014) and Aasness and Odeck (2015). Externalities associated with 
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a network of charging stations could justify tax exemptions for the purchase of EVs; see Greaker 
and Midttømme (2016). Shanjun et al. (2017) find, however, that direct subsidies for investing in 
charging stations are more efficient than subsidies for EVs. The expansion of EVs may also create a 
need for road user charges that are not based on fuel. The present study shows that the optimal tax 
on EVs equals the tax on fossil fuel vehicles when the road user charge is based on GPS tracking 
and other market imperfections are absent.   
5. CONCLUSION 
Many countries have implemented taxes on fuel combined with tax exemptions or subsi-
dies for the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles in order to curb externalities linked to both fuel and 
mileage. According to Parry and Small (2005), the gain in terms of reduced externalities per liter of 
fuel is diminished, however, as households avoid the mileage-related tax component by purchasing 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. Parry and Small’s optimal tax rate on gasoline is reduced accordingly. 
The resulting optimal tax rate in the United States is more than twice as large as the current rate, 
while that for the United Kingdom is about half its current rate.  
This study shows that such avoidance should be neutralized by heavier taxation of fuel-ef-
ficient vehicles, and that current taxation of fuel is sub-optimal in both the US and the UK. The 
theoretical foundation for this result is based on contributions by Innes (1996) and Fullerton and 
West (2002). The present study contributes by constructing operational tax formulas which show 
that the tax on fuel-efficient vehicles should exceed the tax on fuel-intensive vehicles. The study also 
contributes by showing that this result holds in cases with myopic households. Many countries, by 
contrast, have introduced tax exemptions or subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Several car manufacturers have recently been caught manipulating tests to classify their 
vehicles as fuel-efficient. Taxes are avoided and customers are cheated. The heavier tax on fuel-effi-
cient vehicles lowers incentives for such avoidance, and hence contributes to solving this problem. 
Improved testing is of course an alternative.    
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APPENDIX A
First order equations w.r.t. 
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Summing these equations: 
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The first order conditions w.r.t. lt  and cart , and this equation imply that   
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Hence, 
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Substituting *lt  in equation (7) gives   
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Hence, 
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Implementing first order conditions v.r.t. cart  gives  
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Both expressions on the right-hand side are negative. This proves that ∗cart  is negative. 
APPENDIX B
Second order conditions for the government maximization problem, equation (13). The welfare 
function is labeled W.
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The second order condition is satisfied if
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The first inequality condition is satisfied if 0>a . 
The second inequality condition is satisfied when 
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Parameter values and functional forms are restricted to those that satisfy this condition. These re-
strictions are also sufficient to satisfy the second order conditions in the case with myopic behavior. 
APPENDIX C
Second order conditions for the government maximization problem, equation (19).
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Parameter values and functional forms are restricted to those that satisfy this condition. 
APPENDIX D
Equation (20) is modified so that  
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The only difference between this condition and equation (7) is the first term on the left-hand side. 
Hence, implementing equations (21) and (14) implies that 
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Implementing equation (21) implies that  
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APPENDIX E 
A linear approximation of the accumulated demand for driving distance minus total private fuel 
costs for fuel-efficient vehicles equals the area abc in Figure 3. Accumulated demand for driving 
distance minus total private fuel costs for fuel-intensive vehicles equals the area cde. Hence, the 
difference between the accumulated demand for driving distance minus total private fuel costs for 
fuel-intensive and fuel-efficient vehicles equals the area abde. When estimates of current prices and 
taxes measured in dollars, driving and fuel consumption, 0,5=lp , 2 0,116=COp , 0,507=d
p
f
, 
0,623∗ =lt , 0,5 0,5= +low highf f f ,  0,051=highf , 0,041=lowf , 240.000=highkm , 250.000=lowkm , are 
applied, the area abde is found to equal $2,751.35. Thirty percent of abde amounts to approximately 
$825.  
Figure 3.
